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70-5472/1

6 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: D/INR's Letter to ASD(A), dated 2 Nov 70,
re Alternatives to Blue Ribbon Panel
Recommendations


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1. I have sent Ray Cline's letter to Froehlke on to Jack Smith with the suggestion that, when he has had a chance to comment on it, he forward it to [] who also seems to me directly concerned.

2. Ray has made two specific proposals in this letter, one of which he apparently made to Henry Kissinger on the 15th of September. Both of these, I might say, strike me as a little gratuitous but I suppose come within Ray's charter, although it would have been a little more careful on Ray's part to have sent us a copy of his memorandum to Kissinger. (Perhaps he did, but I have no record of it.)

3. Ray's first proposal (which is one that he also made to Kissinger) suggests the creation of an Assessments Panel of USIB "to plan, review, and approve substantive joint studies or reports of direct relevance to NSC policy papers and decisions...." This obviously is a function done, in part at least, by the Board of National Estimates. It is also an area reviewed by Andy Marshall in his capacity as a consultant to Kissinger to review the intelligence process generally and propose ways to make it more helpful and responsive to the needs of policy makers.

4. The problem of how to relate intelligence estimates and judgments to policy and planning needs and discussions has never been wholly solved, in my opinion at least. I believe that the new format for the national estimates has gone a long way toward improving our position in this respect and satisfying earlier criticisms expressed by the NSC staff. I believe Andy Marshall's conclusions were that the normal estimating process was appropriate and adequate to fill needs in most instances. His recommendation was to single out a few topics of priority importance and subject them to a more detailed and comprehensive analysis than has been the case in the past. This is about what has happened to the 11-series estimates as I understand it.

Blue Ribbon Panel

STATE review(s) completed.

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
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5. It may be that further improvements are possible in arrangements under which people preparing intelligence estimates meet directly with policy makers for the purpose of (a) identifying subjects for estimates and (b) the substantive implications of the estimates themselves.

6. Ray Cline's proposal, it seems to me, would have the effect of removing the Board in very large measure from this process, which I do not think would be a good idea.

7. Ray's second proposal relates to the NIRB, which he wants to reconstitute as a Resources Panel of USIB. The relationship between the NIRB and USIB has always been a little ambiguous. We have been proceeding on the assumption that as a practical matter the Board can already "levy requests for studies and advice directly on USIB subcommittees" and has been doing so regularly from the very beginning of the Board. The committee chairman will report to the DCI and will presumably do what the DCI desires him to do.

8. My own view is that the NIRB is more useful if it is kept distinct and apart from USIB, with the thought that USIB determines requirements and priorities for intelligence coverage. The NIRB on the other hand is the advisory body to the DCI to help him develop a responsible judgment about the need for resources, particularly those which cost a lot of money. USIB committees can help this process by interpreting the requirements and needs for data in particular areas. If a member of a committee objects to a position which the committee is taking in response to a request from the NIRB, it can always have the matter referred to USIB. Otherwise the NIRB is entitled to presume that a committee position is authoritative insofar as it constitutes a statement of substantive intelligence requirement. This may be a little complicated but I don't think that integrating the NIRB in the USIB would help very much.


JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

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cc: DDI

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Blue RibbonNovember 2, 1970 *folson*SECRET

Dear Bob:

I appreciate very much the time and effort you took last week to acquaint us with the planning presently underway on the intelligence recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. From personal experience, I know that your task is a difficult one, and I am happy to see the beginning to what I hope will be a big step forward.

Your invitation for comments on the alternatives was also appreciated. We who are workers in the foreign policy vineyards are not only to a very large extent dependent upon Defense-managed collection systems for information but also are deeply and directly concerned with the political implications of the deployment of these systems abroad. We are, therefore, very conscious of the need for the intelligence organization which eventually develops from your planning to have a close and sensitive interface with the national foreign policy machinery.

In reviewing your alternatives, I find that we lean strongly toward alternative three. It has many merits, and would avoid the bureaucratic upheaval that would occur if you tried to move immediately to alternative four--which appears to be a not unreasonable long-term goal. The principal reasons for preferring alternative three are:

1. This alternative would retain a considerable degree of decentralization in the operational management of the collection system so that effective technical liaison can be established at working levels without the need to penetrate too many layers of bureaucratic approvals; we also believe such decentralization is more likely to insure responsiveness to requirements not self-generated, that is, specifically to political and other foreign policy requirements.

The Honorable
Robert F. Froehlke,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Room 3E822, The Pentagon.

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2. It would strengthen the position of the Director of DIA and would enable him to use the authority he needs to fulfill his responsibilities for research, analysis and reporting, not only in Defense, but in the Intelligence Community as a whole.
3. This strengthening of the position of DIA would also help to place the producer-collector relationship in proper balance: production of finished intelligence in support of the needs of the national policy maker should drive collection, and this is not so easy if analytical and research elements seem junior and subordinate to the collection system.
4. Finally, this alternative would provide the ASD (I) with a staff large enough to enable him not only to make intelligence policy, but also to monitor the process of its implementation and even perhaps to undertake program evaluation studies, which probably can be dealt with meaningfully only at this level.

The ASD (I) concept paper is, in my estimation, excellent. I believe if this concept can be followed and your alternative three placed into effect, you will have provided Defense with an organization that will have gone a long way toward meeting the intent of the suggestions made by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

My only reservations about the reorganization you are considering relate to the interface between Defense intelligence components and the rest of the Intelligence Community. I realize this problem cannot be dealt with unilaterally by Defense, but I think State, CIA and Defense should address themselves to interface arrangements very promptly. Briefly, my suggestions for critical elements to be considered are as follows:

1. The United States Intelligence Board (USIB), whatever else might happen in the light of the Defense reorganization, should be restructured in the two following important respects:
 - a) An Assessments Panel, or Steering Committee of USIB, should be established to plan, review, and approve substantive joint studies or reports of direct relevance to NSC policy

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papers and decisions (cf. attached memo to Dr. Kissinger spelling out this suggestion); it would consist of senior analytical (as distinct from operational) intelligence officers of State, Defense and CIA, with other members of USIB serving as observers or participants upon invitation according to subject matter, and it should deal directly with NSC Committees insofar as possible.

- b) The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) should be reconstituted as a Resources Panel, or Steering Committee of USIB, with appropriate State, Defense and CIA membership (as now constituted, I should think) and be authorized to levy requests for studies and advice directly on USIB subcommittees which have functional, management-oriented responsibilities as well as on intelligence program directors in the whole Community.

- 2. State (INR) and ASD (I) should at an early date exchange high-level liaison officers who would work with our respective front-office staffs to insure that essential information about on-going projects and activities is provided in timely fashion from each agency to the other; special emphasis should be put on arranging working-level contacts on an informal basis at the earliest possible point in the development of important joint studies.

My suggestions are all designed to knit the intelligence elements of State, Defense and CIA closer together and enable them to deal effectively with the policy-making elements of our Government both at the Departmental and NSC levels. Only by this joint approach can we, in my view, achieve the better interface with intelligence users which your reorganization is partially intended to facilitate.

I wish you much success in this important and difficult task, and want to thank you for the opportunity to comment on matters in which we have a deep, common interest.

Sincerely,

Ray S. Cline

Attachment:

Cline/Kissinger Memorandum,
Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001000030002-5

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September 15, 1970

MEMORANDUM

To : Dr. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

From : INR - Roy S. Cline

Subject : Intelligence Assessments in the NSC System

You suggested some time ago that I send you a note spelling out my concept of a new element in the intelligence machinery needed to provide more intimate and effective support to NSC policy-making. Here it is, in brief.

The present NSC committee and subcommittee system seems to me to be faulty in the way it arrives at intelligence appreciations of the character and dimensions of threats (or opportunities) in foreign situations affecting American national security interests. The present style is to analyze the key factors in the situation as supporting argument for the analysis of what needs to be done. Diagnosis and remedy get rolled up in one ball of wax, molded by the same group of people. This doesn't necessarily give bad solutions. I believe, however, it is intellectually and procedurally sounder to separate these two analytical functions. Policy studies should be based on agreed intelligence findings (with dissents as appropriate) set forth in the manner which best answers the key questions which are likely to influence the policy makers' thinking about what to do. In my view, intelligence analysts should be protagonists for the "what is the trouble" part of the paper, and policy makers should develop the "options" section. If policy staffs choose to deviate from agreed interpretations of the threat situations they are dealing with, they can do so, but they should note the point at which they decide to take a line differing from what the evidential base suggests.

The U.S. Intelligence Community may not now be geared into the NSC system in a way that permits it readily to provide the kind of evaluation of evidence and assessment of trends that is needed. I think if I were to recommend to you and the Director of Central

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Intelligence how to improve our performance in this respect, I would say we should establish a Special Assessments Panel, made up of the three senior intelligence officers in Washington who have reporting and assessments as their main responsibilities (as distinct from collection activities or operations). These would be, at the present time, General Donald Bennett (CIA), Dr. R. Jack Smith (Deputy, CIA), and myself. This group should be instructed to deal directly with you and would undertake to support the NSC system (including MASAG) by preparing the "estimate of the situation" part of important studies wending their way through the NSC process. It would use interagency intelligence resources for this job. I do not know if better policy making would result, but I think clearer papers would be written and the implications of what eventually was decided would be easier to understand and to explain.

INR/OD:RScline:th:9/19/70.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

2 Nov 1970

Dear Dick,

I think you will
be interested in my comment
to Bob Froehlke on
his reorganization plans.
If you take exception to
any of my suggestions, please
let me know.

Ray